Bulletin for Biblical Research (BBR) 1991

 Bulletin for Biblical Research 1 (1991) 63-88

 

               Uncleanness: A Moral or an
         Ontological Category in the Early
                      Centuries A.D.?

 

 

                                    JACOB NEUSNER
                      THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA

                                               and

                                   BRUCE D. CHILTON
                                         BARD COLLEGE

 

 

   I. SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS AND CATEGORY-FORMATION

 

Diverse Judaic systems, or Judaisms, interpret each in its own way the

received categories of ancient Israelite religion as portrayed in the Old

Testament.1 Consequently, interpreting a given system's documen-

tary representation of a category established in the Israelite writings

of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. requires considerable reflection.

Opening the Old Testament and out of its resources declaring the

meaning of an Old Testament category for a Judaism represented in

much later writings is not merely anachronistic. It also distorts the

later writers' systemic reading and adaptation of the received cate-

gory. For what a systemic construction makes of that category—not

only the selection and definition, but the very classification and the

importance accorded to one Old Testament category and not to

another—finds realization in the systemic construction of all other

categories, that is, in the composition, shape, and structure of the sys-

tem itself. These simple and easily demonstrable principles of analysis

that have emerged in the history of ideas, including theological ideas,

over the past century or so do not always exercise the influence that

they should. Consequently, even today we find harmonization where

 

            1. The first five parts of this article were written by Jacob Neusner and revised by
Bruce D. Chilton. The sixth part was written by Bruce D. Chilton and revised by Jacob
Neusner.


64                      Bulletin for Biblical Research 1

there should be differentiation, mere paraphrase where analysis ought

to take place. Opening the Hebrew Scriptures as an encyclopaedia for

first-century Judaism, people misinterpret the complexity of the Juda-

isms of that time by portraying as a single, unitary, harmonious, and

linear development the chaos of Judaic systemic formation, reconsti-

tution, and even dissolution.

            These general remarks on the importance of differentiation and

analysis, the centrality of context and nuance, will not elicit surprise

and ought to be received as truisms. For who, in this day and age,

imagines a single, unitary "Judaism" emerging in a linear unfolding

straight out of the Old Testament, any more than that a single, unitary

"Christianity" is portrayed, as of its point of origin, by the New Testa-

ment? These conceptions, legitimate theological necessities, everyone

understands, impede the description, analysis, and interpretation of

the diverse Judaic and Christian systems that, leaving their detritus of

holy books, holy doctrines, and holy rites, define the tasks of theology.

A half-century or more of learning separates us from the age in which

anyone fabricated a single, "orthodox" Judaism, and we have gone

beyond the then fruitful debates of Walter Bauer and H. E. W. Turner

on the pattern of Christian truth. Yet we still have accounts of the sin-

gle, unitary and internally harmonious "Judaism" described out of all

sources deemed "normative," without regard to time and place of

composition or auspices and circumstances of promulgation, that

formed the background and setting for "Christianity." So the pretense

of one Judaism and one Christianity is maintained, as though that

single, unitary, harmonious Judaism, spun in a linear path out of the

Old Testament, were any longer accessible of description. And, more

to the point, people still open the Old Testament as the handbook for

that "Judaism" that "Christianity," even in the person of Jesus himself,

addressed.

            A single author, and a single point in question, will show the

intellectual tasks that have yet to be accomplished, specifically, those

of learning how to reframe our questions in light of our own knowl-

edge of diversity and complexity. If we concede that there was a

diversity of Judaic, and also Christian, systems, and that that diver-

sity characterized not only (for Christianity) the second and third cen-

turies but (even) the first, and even ab origine,2 then we can no longer

address matters under the title "Jesus and Judaism." The Gospels

research of our day surely encourages us to speak, rather, of

"Jesuses," as much as, virtually all scholarship knows, we describe

"Judaisms." Then, of course, which Jesus and which Judaism become

              2. Indeed, the theory of a single, unitary beginning itself constitutes a powerful
polemic and apologetic, as Burton Mack demonstrates.




                 NEUSNER & CHILTON: Uncleanness                        65

the centerpiece of inquiry, and category-formation begins at what, at

present, we perceive to be the very commencement of thought.

            By way of illustrating the outcome of recognizing the diversity of

Judaisms, inclusive of the Judaisms presented to us by the Old Testa-

ment, we turn to a simple problem of category-formation. It concerns

the classification or categorization of uncleanness, an important con-

sideration in the Gospels' accounts of Jesus' relationship with persons

and institutions in his time, and also a central category in Judaisms

from the formation of the Old Testament Pentateuch in ca. 450 B.C.

through the framing of the Mishnah in ca. A.D. 200. Specifically, un-

cleanness, here important, there not interesting at all, serves diverse

systems in diverse ways, and any conception that there was a single

reading of the matter is untenable. Not only so, but in one Judaism,

the Essene Judaism of Qumran, uncleanness served as a metaphor for

sin, while in another Judaism, the Judaic system first set forth in the

Mishnah (ca. A.D. 200, on the foundations of materials originating over

the prior two hundred years, some of them from Pharisees),3 the con-

ception of uncleanness functioned in an entirely different framework,

so that associating uncleanness with sin bore no meaning and made

no sense at all. Uncleanness addressed an issue quite distinct from a

moral one, which can be proven very simply. To identify the category

of a conception, address to an authorship the challenge: state the

opposite. The antonym tells us the category that guides thought. In

the Essene Judaism of Qumran, uncleanness served as a metaphor of

evil, and the opposite of unclean was virtuous, e.g., one who dis-

obeyed the rule was punished by being declared unclean for a given

spell. In the Judaic system of the Mishnah, by contrast, the antonym of

uncleanness is holiness (just as is the case, in general, in the book of

Leviticus, as we shall see presently). And virtue and holiness consti-

tute distinct classifications, the one having to do with morality, the

other with ontology. Indeed, as we shall now try to show, phenome-

nologically and also historically, in one important Judaism, with roots

in the first century, uncleanness formed an ontological category, not a

moral one at all. To explain how uncleanness is an ontological, not a

moral, category, is very simple and may be presented with heavy

emphasis:

            To be able to become unclean formed a measure of the capacity to become

holy, so that, the more susceptible to uncleanness, and the more differentiated

the uncleanness to which susceptibility pertained, the more capable of

becoming holy, and the more differentiated the layers and levels of holiness

that entered consideration.

 

            3. See Jacob Neusner, Judaism: The Evidence of the Mishnah (2d printing, augmented;
Atlanta: Scholars Press for Brown Judaic Studies, 1988).

 

66                 Bulletin for Biblical Research 1

            That statement clearly bears no implications whatever for whether

or not an unclean person was a sinner, or a clean person not a sinner.

For in the classification of uncleanness at hand, the opposite of unclean

is holy, precisely as, throughout the priestly code (e.g., the book of

Leviticus) the antonym of unclean is holy, far more than it is merely

clean (tamé/ qaddosh, appears far more regularly than tamé/tahor). As

we shall presently see, in the Mishnah, the more susceptible to

uncleanness a person or an object (e.g., food) is, the more layers or lev-

els of sanctification that person or edible may attain. We think that to

be "holier than thou" means to be more virtuous than the other. But in

the context of the Mishnah's laws, we shall demonstrate at some

length, to be "holier than thou," one has also to be more capable of

becoming more unclean than thou, e.g., to be more susceptible to

uncleanness in more ways or at greater degrees of sensitivity to

uncleanness, than whatever "thou" is at hand.

            Throughout the Mishnah and much of its successor literature,

" Israel ," that is, the social entity of a Judaic system, is consistently

represented as more susceptible to varieties and differentiated types

of uncleanness than gentiles, and that forms, in a systemic context, an

ontological judgment as to the ultimate being of that " Israel ," and not

a moral judgment as to the conduct and ethical character of Israelites

or of " Israel " in general. That is why, as we shall see, representing

uncleanness as sin and a sign of wickedness represents a systemic

reading of uncleanness, not a broadly held conception generated by

"the Old Testament," and, if must follow, representing uncleanness as

part of a hierarchical classification of social entities likewise consti-

tutes a systemic reading of the matter. In both cases we deal with how

systems form their categories, and the way they do so is by making a

systemic statement upon, and through discourse concerning, each of

the systemic categories. What a system says anywhere, it says every-

where.

            In the case at hand, whether or not uncleanness formed a moral or

an ontological category or classification, it must follow, the represen-

tation of uncleanness as a mark of sin or wickedness which requires

eschatological purification through baptism constitutes a Christiani-

ty's reading of uncleanness, not a generally accepted datum upon

which Jesus in particular laid down a judgment or to which he

responded. The Christianity that deemed eschatological immersion

for sin to relate to the category of uncleanness made its statement of

an eschatological system through that detail, as through other details,

and the representation of uncleanness as a matter of sin formed a sys-

temic statement of that Christianity, not a response to or a use of a

fact of "Judaism." There were no facts, there was no Judaism, so far as

our sources tell us, for their accounts portray their respective systems.



               NEUSNER & CHILTON: Uncleanness                          67

  Any other reading of matters, in particular the one that sees a unitary

Judaism emerging in a linear and single development from the Old

Testament, itself being an essentially cogent and harmonious state-

ment, yields only confusion. Evidence of that fact derives from the

rather odd and contradictory representation of uncleanness in a recent

work, as not a matter of morality on one page, then as a matter of sin

and hence wickedness on the next page. Analysis will show what hap-

pens when a single Judaism, against which a single Christianity, in

the person of its founder, Jesus, is to be represented, forms the gener-

ative analogy and the formative metaphor in the mind of scholarship.

The case at hand derives from the properly well-regarded writing of

E. P. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism. His confusion of categories yields a

manifest contradiction in his account of uncleanness as at once merely

functional to entry into the Temple (a trivialization that vastly under-

states matters) but also a symbolism of evil (a correct reading in one

context but not in another context). So Sanders provides our occasion

for the demonstration of the conceptual urgency, for purposes of clear

thought, of the simple propositions with which we commenced.

 

   II. UNCLEANNESS AS A MORAL CATEGORY IN CURRENT
                          NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY

In portraying the laws of uncleanness, E. P. Sanders stresses that

uncleanness in some instances, in an of itself, is a sin. Accordingly, he

reads uncleanness as a moral category. Quite correctly, in describing

the Old Testament account of uncleanness Sanders carefully stresses

that "most impurities do not result from the transgression of a prohi-

bition, although a few do."4 He accurately emphasizes that an impure

person is not a sinner; contact between an impure and a pure person is

not ordinarily considered a sin. Once he has so represented biblical

law, however, Sanders proceeds to allege the following:

 

     One should ask what was the situation of a person who disregarded the
     purity laws and did not use the immersion pool, but remained perpet-
     ually impure. Here it would be reasonable to equate being impure with
     being a "sinner" in the sense of "wicked," for such a person would have
     taken the position that the biblical laws need not be observed.5

That statement contradicts the judgments Sanders makes in his précis

of the biblical representation of uncleanness, except for a single matter,

which is sexual relations between husband and wife when the wife is

menstruating. That is penalized by extirpation (Lev 20:18), as Sanders

says, and represents an exception, again explicitly specified by Sanders:

 

            4. E. P. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985) 183.
            5. Sanders 184.

 

 

68                    Bulletin for Biblical Research 1

      But as a general rule, those who became impure ... did not, as long as
      they lived their ordinary lives, sin. Normal human relations were not
      substantially affected.6

            Now in order to harmonize the judgment made here with the position

taken immediately following, Sanders gives an example, but, as we

shall see, the example exemplifies only its own case:

     All the laws of purity and impurity are to be voluntarily observed. If,
     for example, a husband and wife agreed not to observe the prohibition
     of intercourse during menstruation, no one would ever know unless
     they announced the fact. If the woman never used the immersion pool,
     however, her neighbors would note that she was not observant.... Not
     intending to be observant is precisely what makes one "wicked"; but the
     wickedness comes not from impurity as such, but from the attitude that
     the commandments of the Bible need not be heeded.
            Thus these biblical purity laws, which most people seem to have ob-
     served, did not lead to a fixed view that the common people were
     sinners.7

In fact, the case exhausts the category; the only Old Testament purity-

law that affects conduct outside of the cult is the one that serves

Sanders's claim that being impure may be equated with being a sin-

ner in the sense of wicked.

            Sanders's categorization of impurity as (sometimes) an issue of

morality leaves open the question of how (at other times) we should

classify the matter. The answer to that question will prove diverse, as

we move from one Judaism to another. No one need doubt, for

example, that Sanders's reading of uncleanness as sin will have found,

in the Essene Judaism of Qumran, a broader scope than merely men-

strual uncleanness, and eschatological immersion in view of sin, so

prominent a motif in the description of John the Baptist, assuredly

conforms to Sanders's view. But were we to interrogate the Judaism

represented, as to its initial statement, by the Mishnah, we should

come up with a quite different view of matters.

III. UNCLEANNESS AND THE ONTOLOGY OF THE " ISRAEL "
             OF THE JUDAISM OF THE DUAL TORAH

Let us start from the negative, which may be stated simply and cate-

gorically. Not a single line in the entire Mishnah treats cultic uncleanness

as in and of itself a representation of sin. An unclean person is not a sin-

 

            6. Sanders 183.
            7. Sanders 184-85. Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan Chapter Two contains an
explicit statement in accord with Sanders's example here, drawn from the privacy of
marital relations.



                NEUSNER CHILTON: Uncleanness                            69

ner, therefore not, in Sanders's language, wicked. An unclean person

cannot do things that a clean person can do. We find at Mishnah trac-

tate Sotah 9:15 the following:

     Heedfulness leads to physical cleanliness, cleanliness to levitical purity,
     purity to separateness, separateness to holiness, holiness to humility,
     humility to the shunning of sin, shunning of sin to saintliness, saintli-
     ness to the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit to the resurrection of the dead.

Clearly, the unclean person is not on that account wicked, and a poly-

thetical taxonomic scheme does not permit the contrast only of

uncleanness with morality.

            How, then, does the Mishnah's treatment of uncleanness identify

the correct classification or categorization of the matter? The answer is

that, for the authorship of the Mishnah, uncleanness and cleanness

form ontological rather than moral categories. The capacity to become

clean, a stage on the route to holiness as we saw, finds a counterpart

in the capacity to become unclean; the more "holy" something may

become, the more susceptible it is to uncleanness. Then to be suscepti-

ble to varieties and differentiated forms of uncleanness is a mark of,

not sinfulness but, holiness. That conception finds no place in Sand-

ers's representation of matters. And yet, as we shall now show in a

very specific case, it is fundamental to the concrete legislation of the

Mishnah's authorship, a position so profound in its implications as to

mark as simply beside the point the allegation that an unclean person

was, or could be construed as, a sinner or wicked.

            Let us consider two concrete cases that demonstrate the deep lay-

ers of thought on the hierarchization of uncleanness and holiness in

the Mishnah's system. Both of these statements will show us two facts.

First, that the opposite, for the authorship of the Mishnah, of unclean

was not clean but holy. Second, that the synonym for unclean was not

sinful or wicked but something of an ontological, that is, in context,

hierarchical, ordering of matters. That forms the key to the identifica-

tion as ontological of the matter at hand, the conception that through

capacity to become unclean, on the down side, and holy, on the up

side, we hierarchize the entities before us, e.g., gentiles and " Israel ,"

or common food and food that has been designated as tithe, priestly

rations ("heave offering") and even Most Holy Things of the Temple

altar itself. The first case derives from the very matter in which we

shall presently, in later writings of the same system, find a moral

dimension, namely, "leprosy." What we find here is a simple state-

ment that the more susceptible a person to uncleanness, the more cap-

able that person is of warding off the effects of uncleanness. The

second case, offered in the next section, then will give us a richer per-

ception of what is at stake in the simple assertion of correspondences



70                  Bulletin for Biblical Research 1

  with which we now deal. The reader will want to see the entire matter

as it is set forth in the Mishnah and successor writings, even though

the operative language is presented only in italics at the end. The ver-

sion of the matter at Mishnah tractate Negaim 13:10 is as follows:

13:10  F. If he was standing inside [an unclean house] and put his hand
                outside with his rings on his fingers, if he remained there a
                sufficient interval to eat a piece of bread, they are unclean.


            G. [If] he was standing outside and put his hand inside with his
                rings on his fingers

            H. R. Judah declares [the rings] unclean forthwith.

             I. And sages say, "Until he will remain long enough to eat a piece
                of bread."

             J. They said to R. Judah, "Now if when his entire body is un-
                 clean, he has not made what is on him unclean until he re-
                 mains a sufficient time to eat a piece of bread, when his entire
                 body is not unclean, should he not render unclean that which
                 is on him only after he remains a sufficient time to eat a piece
                 of bread"?

To this point we have no account of Judah 's thinking and therefore

no reason to see the pertinence of the case to the principle we claim to

locate here. To see what is at stake, we turn forthwith to the Tosefta's

amplification of the matter. We present the operative language in

italics:

            K. Said to them R. Judah, "We find that the power of him who is un-
                clean is stronger in affording protection than the power of him who is
                insusceptible to uncleanness.

            L. "Israelites receive uncleanness and afford protection for clothing in
                the diseased house. The gentile and the beast, who do not receive un-
                cleanness, also do not afford protection in the diseased house"
                [T. Negaim 7:9].

The Tosefta's authorship's amplification on Judah 's reasoning pro-

vides the statement of correspondence and contrast, that is, of what is

at stake, that we require. The reader will rightly ask why we maintain

that the Tosefta's reading of the Mishnah's representation of Judah 's

view may be imputed to the Mishnah's authorship's conception, and

the answer is, we can show that elsewhere the Mishnah's authorship

on its own presents precisely that view, only in a much more subtle

and complex statement. So we beg the reader's indulgence.

            To this point, we have offered only a statement of the single prop-

osition that the opposite of unclean is holy, and the synonym of

unclean is not sinful but outsider or gentile. The entire composition as

it is represented by the authorship of Sifra, which cites the Mishnah

and the Tosefta verbatim and then joins the whole to an exegetical



                NEUSNER & CHILTON: Uncleanness                             71

  framework, makes that point explicit, since it introduces the beast and

the gentile as operative categories, and neither the beast nor (by sys-

temic analogy) the gentile forms a moral category, but only an onto-

logical one. We give the Mishnah in bold-face type and the Tosefta in

italicized bold-face type, to make clear the sequence of unfolding and

underline still later work of the authorship of Sifra:8

 

      7. A.  Might one think that the beast and the gentile afford protection
                to garments in the diseased house?

            B. Scripture says, "He will launder the garments" (Lev 14:47)—as
                an inclusionary clause.

            C. He whose clothing can be rendered unclean affords protection to
                clothing in the diseased house.

            D. The beast and the gentile are excluded from the rule, for their
                 clothing is not made unclean, and they do not afford protection
                 for clothing in the diseased house.

            E. In this connection sages have said:

            F. If he was standing inside and put his hand outside with his
                rings on this fingers, if he remained there a sufficient interval
                to eat a piece of bread, he is unclean.

            G. [If] he was standing outside and put his hand inside with his
                 rings on his fingers

            H. R. Judah declares [the ring] unclean forthwith.

            I.  And sages say, "Until he will remain long enough to eat a
                piece of bread."

            J. They said to R. Judah, "Now if when his entire body is un-
                clean, he has not made what is on him unclean until he re-
                mains a sufficient time to eat a piece of bread, when his entire
                body is not unclean, should he not render unclean that which
                is on him only after he remains a sufficient time to eat a piece
                of bread" [M. Neg. 13:10]?

            K. Said to them R. Judah, "We find that the power of him who is
                 unclean is stronger in affording protection than the power of
                 him who is insusceptible to uncleanness.

            L. "Israelites receive uncleanness and afford protection for cloth-
                 ing in the diseased house. The gentile and the beast, who do not
                 receive uncleanness, also do not afford protection in the dis-
                 eased house [T. 7:9].

            Now to review the main point: the most important language is

Judah 's assertion that a person who is more susceptible to uncleanness

also affords greater protection from uncleanness than a person who is

not. If sraelites are susceptible to uncleanness, they also can afford

protection for clothing. Gentiles or beasts, insusceptible to the

uncleanness of "leprosy," entering the afflicted house will forthwith

 

            8. This sequence, Mishnah, which begat the Tosefta, which begat the Sifra and
Sifrés, of course does not work everywhere in the later writings. But it does work here.



72                   Bulletin for Biblical Research 1

produce contamination for garments or sandals which they may be

wearing, even though they themselves are not susceptible to this form

of uncleanness at all. What has all this to do with morality? Nothing

whatsoever. The focus, the issue, these concern one's state or condi-

tion in an utterly abstract world of relationships that are intangible

and unseen, yet, withal, critical. When Sanders correctly says that

uncleanness has nothing to do with morality, he may point to a pas-

sage such as this one. Let us turn to what is at stake in what is clearly

a set of ontological distinctions and points of differentiation.

 
IV. UNCLEANNESS AND HOLINESS IN THE MISHNAIC
    STRATUM OF THE JUDAISM OF THE DUAL TORAH

Judah 's position is personal, hence not normative. But the principle

that he expressed in finding a hierarchical relationship between the

capacity to receive uncleanness and the capacity to afford protection

presents a very important and explicit statement of the matter at

hand. In what follows we shall find a clear hierarchization of sanctifi-

cation in terms of capacity to receive uncleanness, and the hierar-

chization is the premise of discourse, not the private opinion of one

party, hence built into the normative structure of the legal-theologi-

cal system of the Mishnah. What we shall now see in a still less acces-

sible case is that the greater one's susceptibility to uncleanness, the

more exalted one's capacity for sanctification. To state the proposition

in more abstract language, such as ontology demands: the greater the

capacity for differentiation, the higher the potential of consecration.

This fundamentally ontological principle of hierarchization is ex-

pressed in the detail of a legal case, and we shall have to work our

way through the details of the case to see how profoundly imbedded

in the law is the conception of a hierarchical, or rather, hierarchizing,

ontology that is fundamental to the system at hand. This case then

will leave no doubt whatsoever that uncleanness for the system at

hand, that is, the systemic statement of the Mishnah in particular,

forms in no way a moral, but only an ontological category. The sys-

tem as a whole, which proposes a hierarchizing ontology expressed

through sanctification, then makes its statement here, as it will, uni-

formly, at all other relevant points. And to that system, the concep-

tion of uncleanness as a metaphor for evil is simply beside the point,

monumentally irrelevant.

            We see this in a discussion of the several removes from a source of

uncleanness and how they affect food in several degrees of consecra-

tion or sanctification. Once more we turn first to the text, then to the

exposition, of Mishnah-tractate Tohorot 2:2-7.



             NEUSNER & CHILTON: Uncleanness                      73

  Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:2:

A. R. Eliezer says, "(1) He who eats food unclean in the first remove is
     unclean in the first remove;

     "(2) [he who eats] food unclean in the second remove is unclean in
            the second remove;

     "(3) [he who eats] food unclean in the third remove is unclean in the
            third remove."

B. R. Joshua says, "(1) He who eats food unclean in the first remove
     and food unclean in the second remove is unclean in the second re-
     move.

     "(2) [He who eats food] unclean in the third remove is unclean in the
            second remove so far as Holy Things are concerned,

    "(3) and is not unclean in the second remove so far as heave-offering
            is concerned.

C. "[We speak of] the case of unconsecrated food

D. "which is prepared in conditions appropriate to heave offering."

 

Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:3:

A. Unconsecrated food:

     in the first remove is unclean and renders unclean;

B. in the second remove is unfit, but does not convey uncleanness;

C. and in the third remove is eaten in the pottage of heave-offering.

 

Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:4:

A. Heave-offering:

     in the first and in the second remove is unclean and renders unclean;

B. in the third remove is unfit and does not convey uncleanness;

C. and in the fourth remove is eaten in a pottage of Holy Things.

 

Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:5:

A. Holy Things:

     in the first and the second and the third removes are susceptible to
     uncleanness and render unclean;

B. and in the fourth remove are unfit and do not convey uncleanness;

C. and in the fifth remove are eaten in a pottage of Holy Things.

 

Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:6:

A. Unconsecrated food:

     in the second remove renders unconsecrated liquid unclean and ren-
     ders food of heave-offering unfit.

B. Heave-offering:

    in the third remove renders unclean [the] liquid of Holy Things, and
    renders foods of Holy Things unfit,

C. if it [the heave-offering] was prepared in the condition of cleanness
    pertaining to Holy Things.



74                    Bulletin for Biblical Research 1

     D. But if it was prepared in conditions pertaining to heave-offering, it
          renders unclean at two removes and renders unfit at one remove in
          reference to Holy Things.

 

     Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:7:

     A. R. Eleazar says, "The three of them are equal:

     B. "Holy Things and heave-offering, and unconsecrated food:
         "which are at the first remove of uncleanness render unclean at two
         removes and unfit at one [further] remove in respect to Holy Things;
         "render unclean at one remove and spoil at one [further] remove in
         respect to heave-offering;
         "and spoil unconsecrated food.

     C. "That which is unclean in the second remove in all of them renders
          unclean at one remove and unfit at one [further] remove in respect to
          Holy Things;
          "and renders liquid of unconsecrated food unclean;
          "and spoils foods of heave-offering.

     D. "The third remove of uncleanness in all of them renders liquids of
          Holy Things unclean,
          "and spoils food of Holy Things."

            Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:2-7 presupposes knowledge of the

Mishnaic system of ritual purity. A review of some of its essential ele-

ments is necessary for an understanding of the arguments and analy-

ses that follow. In the system, ritual impurity is acquired by contact

with either a primary or a secondary source of uncleanness, called a

"Father" or a "Child" (or "Offspring") of uncleanness, respectively. In

the first category are contact with a corpse, a person suffering a flux, a

leper, and the like. Objects made of metal, wood, leather, bone, cloth,

or sacking become Fathers of uncleanness if they touch a corpse.

Foodstuffs and liquids are susceptible to uncleanness, but will not

render other foodstuffs unclean in the same degree or remove of

uncleanness that they themselves suffer. Foodstuffs furthermore will

not make vessels or utensils unclean. But liquids made unclean by a

Father of uncleanness will do so if they touch the inner side of the

vessel. That is, if they fall into the contained space of an earthenware

vessel, they make the whole vessel unclean.

            Food or liquid that touches a Father of uncleanness becomes

unclean in the first remove. If food touches a person or vessel made

unclean by a primary cause of uncleanness, it is unclean in the second

remove. Food that touches second-remove uncleanness incurs third-

remove uncleanness, and food that touches third-remove uncleanness

incurs fourth-remove uncleanness, and so on. But liquids touching

either a primary source of uncleanness (Father) or something unclean

in the first or second remove (Offspring) are regarded as unclean in

the first remove. They are able to make something else unclean. If, for


            NEUSNER & CHILTON: Uncleanness                             75

example, the other side of a vessel is made unclean by a liquid—thus

unclean in the second remove—and another liquid touches the outer

side, the other liquid incurs not second, but first degree uncleanness.

            Heave-offering (food raised up for priestly use only) unclean in

the third remove of uncleanness, and Holy Things (that is, things

belonging to the cult) unclean in the fourth remove, do not make other

things, whether liquids or foods, unclean. The difference among

removes of uncleanness is important. First degree uncleanness in com-

mon food will convey uncleanness. But, although food unclean in the

second remove will be unacceptable, it will not convey uncleanness,

that is, third degree uncleanness. But it will render heave-offering

unfit. Further considerations apply to heave-offering and Holy Things.

Heave-offering can be made unfit and unclean by a first, and unfit by

a second, degree of uncleanness. If it touches something unclean in the

third remove, it is made unfit, but itself will not impart fourth degree

uncleanness. A Holy Thing that suffers uncleanness in the first, sec-

ond, or third remove is unclean and conveys uncleanness. If it is

unclean in the fourth remove, it is invalid for the cult but does not

convey uncleanness. It is much more susceptible than are noncultic

things. Thus, common food that suffers second degree uncleanness

will render heave-offering invalid. We already know that it makes liq-

uid unclean in the first remove. Likewise, heave-offering unclean in

the third remove will make Holy Things invalid and put them into a

fourth remove of uncleanness. With these data firmly in hand, let us

turn to a general discussion of M. Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:2-7.

            Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:2 introduces the removes of unclean-

ness. Our interest is in the contaminating effect upon a person of eat-

ing unclean food. Does the food make the person unclean in the same

remove of uncleanness as is borne by the food itself? Thus if one eats

food unclean in the first remove, is he unclean in that same remove?

This is the view of Eliezer. Joshua says he is unclean in the second

remove. The dispute, Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:2A–B, at Mishnah-

Tractate Tohorot 2:2C–D is significantly glossed. The further consid-

eration is introduced as to the sort of food under discussion. Joshua is

made to say that there is a difference between the contaminating

effects upon the one who eats heave-offering, on the one side, and

unconsecrated food prepared in conditions of heave-offering, on the

other. This matter, the status of unconsecrated food prepared as if it

were heave-offering, or as if it were Holy Things, and heave-offering

prepared as if it were Holy Things, forms a substratum of our chapter,

added to several primary items and complicating the exegesis.

Tosefta-Tractate Tohorot 2:1 confirms, however, that primary to the

dispute between Eliezer and Joshua is simply the matter of the effects

of food) unclean in the first remove upon the person who eats such



76                      Bulletin for Biblical Research 1

food. The gloss, Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:2C–D, forms a redac-

tional-thematic link between Joshua's opinion and the large construc-

tion of Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:3-7. Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot

2:3-5, expanded and glossed by Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:6, follow

a single and rather tight form. The sequence differentiates unconse-

crated food, heave-offering, and Holy Things each at the several

removes from the original source of uncleanness.

            Eleazar, Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:7, insists that, at a given

remove, all three are subject to the same rule. The contrary view,

Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:3-6, is that unconsecrated food in the

first remove makes heave-offering unclean and at the second remove

spoils heave-offering; it does not enter a third remove and therefore

has no effect upon Holy Things. Heave-offering at the first two

removes may produce contaminating effects, and at the third remove

spoils Holy Things, but is of no effect at the fourth. Holy Things in the

first three removes produce uncleanness, and at the fourth impart

unfitness to other Holy Things. Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:6 then

goes over the ground of unconsecrated food at the second remove,

and heave-offering at the third. The explanation of Mishnah-Tractate

Tohorot 2:6C is various; the simplest view is that the clause glosses

Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:6B by insisting that the heave-offering to

which we refer is prepared as if it were Holy Things, on which

account, at the third remove, it can spoil Holy Things. At Mishnah-

Tractate Tohorot 2:7 Eleazar restates matters, treating all three—Holy

Things, heave-offering, and unconsecrated food—as equivalent to

one another at the first, second, and third removes, with the necessary

qualification for unconsecrated food that it is like the other, conse-

crated foods in producing effects at the second and even the third

removes. Commentators read Eliezer. They set the pericope up against

Joshua's view at Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:2, assigning to Joshua

Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:3ff. as well. To state the upshot simply:

            So far as Eleazar is concerned, what is important is not the source of

contamination—the unclean foods—but that which is contaminated, the

unconsecrated food, heave-offering, and Holy Things.

            He could not state matters more clearly than he does when he

says that the three of them are exactly equivalent. And they are, 

because the differentiations will emerge in the food affected, or con-

taminated, by the three. So at the root of the dispute is whether we

gauge the contamination in accord with the source—unconsecrated

food, or unconsecrated food prepared as if it were heave-offering, and

so on—or whether the criterion is the food which is contaminated.

Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:3-5 are all wrong, Eleazar states explic-

itly at Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:7A, because they differentiate

among uncleanness imparted by unclean unconsecrated food, unclean


 

                NEUSNER & CHILTON: Uncleanness                     77

heave-offering, and unclean Holy Things, and do not differentiate

among the three sorts of food to which contamination is imparted. It is

surely a logical position, for the three sorts of food do exhibit differe-

ntiated capacities to receive uncleanness; one sort is more contamin-

able than another.

            And so too is the contrary view logical: what is more sensitive to

uncleanness also will have a greater capacity to impart uncleanness. The

subtle debate before us clearly is unknown to Eliezer and Joshua at

Mishnah-Tractate Tohorot 2:2. To them the operative categories are

something unclean in first, second, or third removes, without distinc-

tion as to the relative sensitivities of the several types of food which

may be unclean. The unfolding of the issue may be set forth very

briefly by way of conclusion: the sequence thus begins with Eliezer

and Joshua, who ask about the contaminating power of that which is

unclean in the first and second removes, without regard to whether it

is unconsecrated food, heave-offering, or Holy Things. To them, the

distinction between the capacity to impart contamination, or to receive

contamination, of the several sorts of food is unknown. Once, how-

ever, their question is raised—in such general terms—it will become

natural to ask the next logical question, one which makes distinctions

not only among the several removes of uncleanness, but also among

the several sorts of food involved in the processes of contamination.

            This protracted and somewhat arcane discussion, akin to a kind of

physics in its abstraction, shows us with great power how uncleanness

looks when it forms an ontological category within a hierarchizing

system. Readers should not, however, imagine that the view of

uncleanness as an ontological category exhausts matters within the

unfolding of the Judaism of the dual Torah. The Mishnah formed only

the initial statement. Other successor documents made their own

statements, sometimes in addressing Scripture, the written Torah,

sometimes in dealing with the Mishnah, the oral Torah. A full picture

of matters therefore requires us to show how uncleanness looks when,

in the system of Judaism at hand, it serves as a moral, not an ontologi-

cal, classification.

 

         V. UNCLEANNESS AS A MORAL CATEGORY IN
LATER CANONICAL WRITINGS OF THE JUDAISM OF THE DUAL
                                            TORAH

Now that we have a clear picture of how uncleanness serves within

the system of the Mishnah, namely, as an ontological category, as

indicator of holiness, we turn to the disposition of that same category

in later stages of the same Judaic system. For, as time rendered still

more remote the reality of the cult and as the focus of thought within

the unfolding system shifted to the governance, by sages, of that holy

 


78                    Bulletin for Biblical Research 1

community that persisted beyond the end of the holy Temple , the

ongoing system, as represented in successive writings, exhibited cate-

gorical reconstructions in diverse ways. And one of these ways, we

think symptomatic of systemic changes in other categories also, repre-

sented uncleanness as not an ontological but a moral category.

            The representation of levitical or cultic uncleanness as a matter of

sin emerges, in the unfolding of the writings of the Judaism originally

set forth in the Mishnah (a Judaism we call "the Judaism of the dual

Torah"), only in much later stages, in documents brought to closure

long after the destruction of the Temple . Then uncleanness does serve

as a metaphor for evil. A very rapid survey of the representations of

uncleanness in successive documents beyond the Mishnah shows us

that a contrast between uncleanness and morality was drawn by the

authorship of the Tosefta, which condemned the view that "the

uncleanness of the knife is more disturbing to Israel than the shedding

of blood."9

            Explicit statements that uncleanness forms an indicator of wick-

edness emerge in documents that first reached closure not before

A.D. 300, and possibly considerably after that time. Here is an explicit

statement:

     R. Yosé the Galilean10 says, "Come and see how strong is the power of
     sin, for before they put forth their hands in transgression, they were
     not found among [the Israelites] people unclean through having a dis-

 

            9. Tosefta Kippurim 1:12.
            10. It should be clear that the temporal assignment of sayings rests solely on the
time of closure of the documents that contain those sayings, not on the attributions,
which cannot be shown to go back to the time and person to whom the sayings are as-
signed. Since the same saying can be given by diverse authorships and their documents
to various authorities, and since no attribution can be shown to derive from firsthand
evidence, e.g., a book written by a named authority and preserved by his disciples in a
chain of transmission we can trace as we can, for example, books by Philo, Josephus,
Paul, Irenaeus, Justin, and other first and second (and later) century figures, there is no
alternative for critical scholarship. We therefore trace the canonical history of ideas, that
is, the point, in the unfolding of the writings, at which a saying first occurs or an idea
first makes its presence known. The sequence of writings, first this, then that, is be-
yond serious doubt, since writings posterior to the Mishnah, such as the Tosefta, Sifra,
and the two Sifrés, cite the Mishnah verbatim entirely outside the structure of their own
discourse and comment on Mishnah-passages. The received conception of these writings
as deriving from the first and second centuries, that is, the same time as the period of
the formation of the Mishnah, and not from the third or fourth or still later times, rests
upon the occurrence of the same names in both the Mishnah and the Tosefta or Sifra or
the two Sifrés. That same theory assigns to the first or second centuries all sayings in the
two Talmuds that appear bearing attributions of authorities who lived in those early
times. But absent the demonstration that that was so, we can no more assume that if the
Tosefta or the Talmud of the Land of Israel or the Talmud of Babylonia assigns a saying
to Yosé the Galilean, he really made that saying, than we can take for granted that
Moses really said everything that the Pentateuchal authorships say he said.


                NEUSNER & CHILTON: Uncleanness                            79

     charge and lepers, but after they put forth their hands in transgression,

     there were among them people unclean through having a discharge

     and lepers. . . . "11

            True, no rabbi ever declared a sinner to be cultically unclean on that

account, while in the Essene Judaism of Qumran, being impure is a

sin, just as committing certain sins automatically imposed a period of

uncleanness.12 Still, we cannot doubt that, for the authorship that has

included the saying attributed to Yosé, uncleanness marked a moral

category.

            A still more explicit statement of the same viewpoint, quite

specific to a single, identified sin, maintains that the skin ailment

described in Leviticus 13 (wrongly translated "leprosy") is caused by

a specific sin, namely, gossip. This view appears in Tosefta Negaim

6:7, Sifré to Deuteronomy 175, and Sifra Mesora Parashah 5:9, and is

as follows:

 

      8.  A. "Saying" (Lev 14:35)--

            B. The priest will say to him words of reproach: "My son, plagues
                come only because of gossip [T. 6:7], as it is said, 'Take heed of the
                plague of leprosy to keep very much and to do, remember what
                the Lord God did to Miriam' (Deut 24:8).

            C. "And what has one thing to do with the other?

            D. "But this teaches that she was punished only because of gossip.

            E. "And is it not an argument a fortiori?

            F. "If Miriam, who did not speak before Moses' presence, suffered
                 so, one who speaks ill of his fellow in his very presence, how
                 much the more so?"

            G. R. Simeon b. Eleazar says, "Also because of arrogance do plagues
                come, for so do we find concerning Uzziah,

            H. "as it is said, 'And he rebelled against the Lord his God and he
                came to the Temple of the Lord to offer on the altar incense and
                Azzariah the Priest came after him and with him priests of the
                Lord, eighty strong men, and they stood against Uzziah and said
                to him, It is not for you to do, Uzziah, to offer to the Lord, for only
                the priests the sons of Aaron who are sanctified do so. So forth
                from the sanctuary. And Uzziah was angry,' etc. (2 Chr 26:16 f.)"
                [T. Neg. 6:7H].

 

The same inquiry into the moral foundations of cultic uncleanness

leads the authorship of Babylonian Talmud Niddah at 31b to attribute

to Simeon b. Yohai the following explanation for the requirement that

a woman after childbirth bring a sacrifice:

 

            11. Sifre to Numbers Naso 2.
            12. See Neusner, Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973) 81.



80                 Bulletin for Biblical Research 1  

     "When she kneels in bearing, she swears impetuously that she will
     have no intercourse with her husband. The Torah . . . ordained that she
     should bring a sacrifice."

But this does not encompass Levitical uncleanness in particular. To

summarize: the view that impurity is a sign of sin does not occur in

the Mishnah. It does occur in the Tosefta in the specific allegation that

leprosy is a sign that a person is guilty of having gossiped or is a sign

of arrogance. Even in these passages, however, no concrete sanction or

penalty of a moral order is invoked, as an explicit violation of the law

would precipitate a concrete sanction. Sages do not leave a record of

having imposed a penalty of uncleanness upon a gossip.

 

         VI. CONFUSION IN CATEGORY-FORMATION:
   UNCLEANNESS AND SANDERS'S JESUS AND JUDAISM

 

As the discussion above demonstrates, the distinction between of

cleanness and holiness is centrally important to that system of Judaism

which animates the Mishnah. Indeed, that distinction is irreducible or

systemic: there is no future in attempting to decipher the two condi-

tions, of being clean and being holy, as metaphors of moral station or

of accessibility to redemption. The issue naturally emerges, however,

whether that Judaism evinced by Mishnah is the milieu in which the

movement that resulted in the New Testament unfolded. Methodolog-

ical skepticism is warranted, but an undifferentiated exclusion of the

evidence of Mishnah would be most unwise. Early, pre-Mishnaic

Judaism is not substantially recoverable from sectarian, Hellenistic,

and apocalyptic writings alone. They are no more "normative" than

Rabbinica was once taken to be. The rabbis and their predecessors con-

tributed to the mix of early Judaism, although their dominance

brought about a distinctive phase, a Judaism in which purity was a

matter of fidelity to halakhah, as defined by the dual Torah, and no

longer a matter of what actually could occur in association with wor-

ship in the Temple . But the issue of purity is inherent within the Gos-

pels, that is to say, within that development of Judaism—shaped by

Jesus and his followers—which produced the Gospels.

            If we may limit our attention, for the moment, to one thematic

example from the Synoptic Gospels, the matter of purifying leprosy

proves to be of systemic importance. Jesus cleanses a leper, and orders

him to see a priest and bring an offering (Matt 8:1-4/Mark 1:40-44/

Luke 5:12-14). Sometimes by the presentation of comparable material

(cf. Matt 11:5/Luke 7:22), sometimes by employing differing rhetori-

cal tactics and materials altogether (cf. Matt 10:8; Luke 17:11-19),

Matthew and Luke contrive to present cleansing from leprosy as a

characteristic and paradigmatic feature of Jesus' ministry.



                   NEUSNER & CHILTON: Uncleanness                     81

            When Sanders deals with the question of sayings of Jesus in

which practices of purity are commended or condemned, he makes

short shrift of them, as being unauthentic in their present form.13 He

is not loath, in principle, to dismiss entire pericopae, such as the story

concerning what happened where Jesus' disciples plucked grain on

the Sabbath, as "creation(s) of the church."14 It is possible that the

pericope of the cleansing of the leper might be dealt with in that way

(although that has not been the trend in recent scholarship), but Sand-

ers's index gives no trace of such a treatment. It is interesting, in this

context, that the eight "almost indisputable facts" about Jesus, upon

which Sanders sets out to base his work, contain no reference at all to

any of Jesus' disputes concerning purity and holiness.15

            His closest approach to that nexus of issues is in his discussion of

Jesus' occupation of the Temple . In that discussion, however, Sanders

consciously dispenses with an approach based upon a sensitivity to

purity,16 and instead argues that "Jesus' action is to be regarded as a

symbolic demonstration,"17 in respect to the destruction of the

Temple . The idea is that Jesus predicted the end of the extant Temple ,

and the establishment of a new one, as a prophet of restoration, after

the pattern of Essene and apocalyptic literature.18 Instead of serving

as a focus of sanctity, in Sanders's judgment the Temple is purely

where Jesus chooses to engage in a symbolic act. The category of

cleanness is simply left to one side.

            There appear to be two reasons for which Sanders proceeds in the

manner he does. First, he genuinely believes that matters of purity, in

the Judaisms of the first century, were expendable. He conceives of the

Pharisees, for example, as a party devoted to the oral law and its

explication, rather than as a movement concerned systemically with

issues of purity.19 "Ritual" and "trivia" are to Sanders's mind a natural

 

            13. Jesus and Judaism (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985) 260, 261, 276, 277 (on Matt 23:25,
26) and 266 (on Mark 7:19). Luke 11:39 is not cited in the index.
            14. Jesus and Judaism 266, on the same page on which Mark 7:19 is discussed.
            15. Jesus and Judaism 11.
            16. Jesus and Judaism 67, 68.
            17. Jesus and Judaism 69-71.
            18. Jesus and Judaism 77-90.
            19. Jesus and Judaism 188, 388, 389. Sanders leaves out of consideration Neusner's
Judaism: The Evidence of Mishnah (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), in which a
systemic concern for sanctification is established. Two recent works, by scholars of the
New Testament, accept the Pharisaic focus upon purity; cf. M. J. Borg, Conflict, Holiness
and Politics in the Teaching of Jesus: Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity 5 (New
York : Mellen, 1984) and R. P. Booth, Jesus and the Laws of Purity, Tradition and Legal History
in Mark 7: Journal for the Study of the New Testament, Supplement Series 13 ( Sheffield :
JSOT, 1986). Sanders appears not to have observed that the Pharisaic and rabbinic
movements did not regard their traditions as ends in themselves, but as instrumental.


82                    Bulletin for Biblical Research 1

association,20 so that a concern with such matters would not, on his

assessment, characterize a group as important as the Pharisees

undoubtedly were. Second, Sanders has a consistent interest in por-

traying Jesus as a teacher who accepted, not merely the impure, but

the wicked into his fellowship. Indeed, the latter concern amounts to a

driving force within Jesus and Judaism, and requires detailed explana-

tion in respect to the present question.

            In his longest consideration of the place of purity in Judaism,21

Sanders accepts without demur that cleanness was fundamentally

related to the suitability of persons or objects to approach the Temple .

Once the issue is placed in that context, of course, the pericopae in

which Jesus is said to engage in disputes concerning purity are natu-

rally associated with those in which Jesus pronounces on cultic mat-

ters. His cultic teaching in Matthew includes reference to the taking of

oaths (23:16-22), instructions for the offering of sacrifice (5:23, 24),

and an elaborate story which relates to the payment of the half shekel

(17:24-27,22 cf. 23:23; Luke 11:42). All of those passages are uniquely

Matthean, and yet are widely accepted as relating to the substance of

Jesus' attitude towards the Temple . Multiply attested traditions—

Jesus' teaching in respect to a widow's offering (Mark 12:41-44; Luke

21:1-4), his occupation of the holy precincts (Matt 21:12, 13; Mark

11:15-17; Luke 19:45, 46), his discourse concerning the destruction of

the Temple (Matt 26:61; Mark 14:58)—consistently reinforce the

impression that the Temple was no mere symbol, but a focus of active,

practical concern within Jesus' movement.23 But Sanders ignores the

natural association of purity with the Temple , and deconstructs

purity, in terms of moral wickedness.

            The collapse of purity, from a cultic category of integral meaning,

into a subset of moral stature, is accomplished by means of dubious

exegesis. Proceeding from a reading of Lev 7:22-27 (the prohibition

against eating fats and blood), Sanders comes to the conclusion that

 

What distinguished them from the covenanters of Qumran , Philo, and the teachers of
Wisdom in the Diaspora was not a concern for traditions of the elders, but what they did
with such traditions.
            20. The linking of the two words in several forms appears in Jesus and Judaism 180,
187, 210. Sanders first refers to "ritual and trivia" when he characterizes the tendency of
scholarship to equate ritual and trivia as Pharisaic preoccupations. In his defense of the
Pharisees, he seems thoughtlessly to consign the issue of purity to puritanical "minu-
tiae" (187).
            21. Jesus and Judaism 182-85.
            22. Cf. Chilton, "A Coin of Three Realms (Matthew 17:24-27)," The Bible in Three
Dimensions (eds D. J. A. Clines, S. E. Fowl, S. E. Porter: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990)
269-82.
            23. Cf. Chilton, "[w(j] frage/lliou e)k sxoiui&wn (John 2.15," Templum Amicitiae (ed.
W. Horbury; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991) 330-44.

 


               NEUSNER & CHILTON: Uncleanness                       83  

"A few purity transgressions, such as eating blood, are in and of

themselves sins; that is, they require atonement."24 The sole justifica-

tion for the finding is a) that the penalty for the act in Leviticus is that

the transgressor "shall be cut off from his people," and b) that "In the

later Rabbinic interpretation, 'cutting of' puts the transgression

strictly between human (sic!) and God, and is atoned for by repen-

tance."25 The simple fact of the matter is, that the phrase only appears

in Leviticus within the nexus of purity and sacrifice (7:20, 21, 25, 27;

17:4, 9, 14; 18:29; 19:8; 20:17, 18; 22:3; 23:29).26 That Sanders should cite

a few verses in isolation, blandly ignore their literary setting, impute a

foreign meaning to them, and then transfer that meaning to the whole

of "the later Rabbinic interpretation," is nothing short of astonishing.

And if we wish to discover what that "later Rabbinic interpretation"

is, we are directed to that well-known source of ancient exegesis, Paul

and Palestinian Judaism.27 The relevant pages of Sanders's earlier work,

however, in no way address the issue at hand. The point Sanders

established in his book on Paul is that repentance effected atonement

(as was only natural in the period after the destruction of the

Temple ),28 not that anything which required atonement was to be

seen as wicked. (As a matter of fact, Sanders particularly stresses, in

the pertinent section, that "sins against God were more easily for-

given than sins against one's fellow-man." In other words, the ten-

dency of the argument is diametrically opposed to what is being said

in Jesus and Judaism.) The assertion in respect to "later Rabbinic inter-

pretation" in Jesus and Judaism, then, is made without support.

            The basis of Sanders's perspective is less any text or group of

texts, than a global view of Judaism: "wickedness comes not from

impurity as such, but from the attitude that the commandments of the

Bible need not be heeded."29 Sanders's intentionalist construal of

Judaism is also apparent in his earlier work;30 the grounds of his

confident generalization are less so. It is nonetheless used as a herme-

neutical category which links early Judaism and rabbinic Judaism:

 

            24. Jesus and Judaism 183.
            25. Ibid.
            26. 20:17 may appear to be an exception, in that the issue is sexual, but the context
of the chapter, and particularly the material which follows, establishes the normative
perspective of Leviticus.
            27. Cf. Jesus and Judaism 387 n. 41.
            28. E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism. A Comparison of Patterns of Religion
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977) 179, 180.
            29. Jesus and Judaism 185.
            30. Paul and Palestinian Judaism 147. Sanders here calls the intentionalism on which
he bases his scheme "all-pervasive." Unfortunately, the "intention" to which he appeals
as a rabbinic category is not defined or defended.


84                        Bulletin for Biblical Research 1

     After the destruction of the Temple , repentance was substituted for all

     the sacrifices prescribed in the law, although the Day of Atonement

     maintained a special place in Jewish life. Ultimately, what is required is

     that one intends to remain in the covenant, intends to be obedient.31

   

Sanders's conclusion therefore requires a faulty exegesis of Leviticus,

an excessively unitary view of Judaism, and a hypothetically invoked

myth of intentionalism. Only so can impurity be equated with

wickedness.

            The thematic importance of that equation pervades Jesus and Juda-

ism. Sanders treats "the sinners" as a primary category through which

Jesus' ministry is to be approached.32 Within that treatment, the cate-

gory of impurity dissolves into that of sin, and sin, in turn, becomes

wickedness. Sanders relates the term "sinners," in the accusation that

Jesus' fellowship included the unacceptable, to the word "wicked" in

Hebrew (reša‘im), which Sanders construes to be a technical term for

those outside the pale of Judaism. No argumentation whatever is

offered for the equation with hamartōloi ("sinners") in the Gospels,

apart from a reference (once again) to Paul and Palestinian Judaism.33

The discussion in that work also does not substantiate a reading of

hamartōloi in terms of reša‘im, although it does establish that "the

wicked" are, on the whole, scheduled more for punishment than for

repentance. The central, linguistic equation of Sanders's case, however,

remains unexamined. From the point of view of ordinary, exegetical

practice, that is the Achilles' heel of the thesis under consideration.

            Within the Septuagint, hamartōlos corresponds to five roots in the

Masoretic Text (ht', hnp, hrš, r‘, rš‘), only one of which would support

the equation proposed by Sanders.34 When the probabilities of transla-

tion into Aramaic are also taken into account, that equation appears

difficult to sustain. The root rš‘ does appear, for example, in the Isaiah

Targum, both adjectivally and as an abstract noun. The Hebrew roots

rš‘ and hnp are represented by the Aramaic usage, but the other three

equivalents of hamartōlos are not.35 Clearly, the linguistic range of rš‘  in

Aramaic is not as wide as that of hamartōlos in Greek. By contrast, the

roots rš‘, hnp, ht', and several others are presented by appropriate forms

 

            31. Paul and Palestinian Judaism 177.
            32. Jesus and Judaism 174-211.
            33. Jesus and Judaism 386 n. 16, citing Paul and Palestinian Judaism 142f., 203, 342-45,
351-55, 357f., 361, 399-404, 414.
            34. E. Hatch and H. A. Redpath, A Concordance to the Septuagint ( Athens : Beneficial,
1977) 64, 65. Sanders's review of the evidence of the Septuagint is so incomplete as to be
misleading, cf. p. 342 in Paul and Palestinian Judaism. The simple fact is that hamartōlos is
used too flexibly to be equated with a "technical term" of restricted meaning, as Sanders
claims in Jesus and Judaism 177.
            35. J. B. van Zijl, A Concordance to the Targum of Isaiah (Missoula: Scholars, 1979)
182, 183.


 

                  NEUSNER & CHILTON: Uncleanness                           85  

of the Aramaic term, hwb' (or its verbal counterpart, hwb): "debtor," or

"sinner," is the functional equivalent of words covering a variety of

defects in the Masoretic Text. When the semantic range of Targumic

hwb' is considered, two features of the usage are immediately striking

from the present point of view. First, because rš‘ can be included within

a wider list of roots for representation by a form of hwb', the argument

that "the wicked" is a technical term appears strained. (There is, of

course, no question but that "the wicked" is a harsh designation; only

its technical meaning, as putting someone beyond the pale of the cove-

nant, is at issue here.) Second, the Aramaic usage hwb', which may or

may not represent (or correspond to) rš‘ in Hebrew, is the natural coun-

terpart of hamartōlos in the Septuagint. As a simple matter of fact, "debt-

ors" can be seen in the Targum of Isaiah as punished by the Messiah

(11:4), broken by the LORD (14:4, 5), but also as capable of repentance

(28:24, 25),36 or a species of wicked Gentile (34:2), or another enemy

of Jerusalem (54:17).37 Such various usages make any appeal to a

univocal or exclusive meaning of the Aramaic term seem incredible.

Quite evidently, a contextual construal of living in-stances of the word

will alone produce an accurate appraisal of its meaning.

            Within the Gospels, a coherent language of "debt" is attributed to

Jesus. When, in the Matthean version of the Lord's Prayer, Jesus

instructs his followers to ask God, "forgive us our debts, as we also

forgive our debtors," there is no doubt but that the New Testament is

preserving an Aramaic idiom (6:12). Luke only partially preserves the

usage: "Forgive us our sins, as we also forgive everyone who is

indebted to us" (11:4). Jesus' recourse to the Aramaic idiom is not a

mere matter of convention: several of his parables turn on the meta-

phorical and literal senses of "debt," much as in the Targum of Isaiah

50:1, where the term refers in one breath to money owed, and in

another breath to sins before God.38

            Several instances of parabolic presentation of "debt" in this sense

are especially striking. In Matt 18:23-35, a debtor is said to owe the

astronomical sum of ten thousand talents (18:24). When it is borne in

 

            36. Cf. Chilton, "Jesus and the Repentance of E. P. Sanders," Tyndale Bulletin 39
(1988) 1-18.
            37. Cf. van Zijl (1979) 57, 58; A. Sperber, The Bible in Aramaic III The Latter Prophets
(Leiden: Brill, 1962), and B. D. Chilton, The Isaiah Targum: Introduction, Translation, and
Notes: The Aramaic Targum (Wilmington: Glazier, 1987).
            38. The passage reads as follows:
     Thus says the LORD, "Where is the bill of divorce which I gave your congregation,
     that it is rejected? Or who had a debt against me, to whom I have sold you? Behold,
    for your sins you were sold, and for your apostasies your congregation was rejected."
As in Chilton (1987), italicized words represent innovative departures of the Aramaic
rendering from the Hebrew text which underlies it. The first usage of "debt" corresponds

 


86                   Bulletin for Biblical Research 1  

mind that the annual imposition of tax upon the whole of Galilee and

Peraea amounted to merely two hundred talents (cf. Antiquities

17.9.4), the hyperbole involved in the parable becomes readily appar-

ent. The debtor is in no position to repay such a debt, nor is there any

credible way in which he could have incurred it. He behaves astound-

ingly, after his debt is forgiven (v 27), in a manner all but calculated to

trivialize such forgiveness: he refuses to deal mercifully with a col-

league who owed him one hundred denarii (vv 28-30). The latter

amount is by no means insignificant: a single denarius has been esti-

mated as the going rate for a full day of labor.39 But the contrast with

the king's incalculable generosity cannot be overlooked, and the close

of the parable makes it unmistakably plain that God's forgiveness

demands ours (vv 31-35). To fail to forgive one's fellow, even when

what needs to be forgiven is considerable, is to betray the very logic of

forgiveness which alone gives us standing before God.

            Two other parables portray, in an apparently paradoxical fashion,

the inextricable link between divine forgiveness and our behavior.

Within the story of Jesus at the house of a Pharisee named Simon

(Luke 7:36-50), a parable explains why Jesus chose to forgive a sinful

woman (vv 40-43). Of two debtors, the one who has been released

from the greater debt will obviously love his creditor more. The sinful

woman's great love, therefore, in an outlandish display of affection

and honor (vv 37-38, 44-46), is proof that God had forgiven her

(v 47). Her love is proof of her capacity to be forgiven.40 She had suc-

ceeded precisely where the unforgiving servant of Matthew 18 had

failed: her actions displayed the value of forgiveness to her. The same

logic, developed more strictly in respect of debt, is evident in

the otherwise inexplicable parable of the crafty steward (Luke 16:1-9).

The lord praised the steward for his cleverness (v 8) in reducing the

debts of those who owed commodities to the lord (vv 5-7). The

scheme was devised so that the lucky debtors would receive the stew-

ard (v 4) after his lord had followed through on the threat of dismiss-

ing the steward for dishonesty (vv 1, 2). On any ordinarily moral

accounting, the steward had gone from bad to worse, and yet his lord

 

well to the underlying idea in the Masoretic Text, which refers to creditors. The second
usage (here rendered "sins") represents "iniquities" in the Hebrew text, and is also a
straightforward, formally correspondent rendering. The point is, however, that both
usages together produce a uniquely Targumic juxtaposition of "debt" in its literal and
metaphorical senses.
            39. J. Jeremias (tr. S. H. Hooke), The Parables of Jesus (London: SCM, 1976) 136-39.
            40. Cf. C. F. D. Moule, ... As we forgive ... ': A Note on the Distinction between
Deserts and Capacity in the Understanding of Forgiveness," Essays in New Testament In-
terpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) 278-86, 282-84.



                    NEUSNER & CHILTON: Uncleanness                        87  

praises him (v 8). Because God is the lord, what would be bribery in

the case of any ordinary master's property turns out to be purposeful

generosity. The effect of the steward's panic is to fulfill the lord's

desire,41 because he is the same as the unforgiving servant's king, the

God who forgave the sinful woman.

            The usage of "debt" attributed to Jesus in the Gospels, therefore,

is initially to be understood as an Aramaism. But he appears, on the

evidence prima facie, to have exploited the metaphorical possibilities of

the term in a way which is precedented in the Targum of Isaiah, but

in a characteristically parabolic fashion. The general activity of telling

parables, of course, is well attested among early rabbis;42 at issue here

is not absolute uniqueness, but the relative distinctiveness which dis-

tinguishes any significantly historical figure from his contemporaries.

A well-established theologoumenon of early Judaism spoke not only

of debts, but of credit in respect to God.43 Jesus appears to have

exploited the latter metaphor, as well as the former (cf. Matt 6:19-21;

19:21; Mark 10:21; Luke 12:33, 34; 18:22). But it was in his adaptation

of an idiom and theology of "debt" that Jesus developed a systemic

aspect of his message as a whole.

            Jesus' usage of the language of debt has provided an opportunity

to test the adequacy of Sanders's thesis. It has elsewhere been doubted

whether the aspect of repentance can be eliminated from the message

of Jesus as easily as Sanders would have it,44 but the focus here is

upon his attempt to use "wickedness" as an over-arching concept,

inclusive of impurity and sin, and more powerful than either. Jesus, as

portrayed by Sanders, "could truly be criticized for including the

wicked in his ‘kingdom.'"45 That portrayal is only possible, as we

have seen, by tendentiously reducing impurity and sin to an artificial

definition of "wickedness," as an intention to put oneself outside the

covenant. Sanders has provided us with a definition of Judaism as

"covenantal nomism," in which the law is an instrument of remaining

within a graciously bestowed covenant. But having offered that useful

insight, Sanders persists in understanding Jesus and Paul as in polar

opposition to a central tenet of Judaism: Jesus includes the wicked,

and Paul includes anyone who accepts participation in Christ.46

 

            41. Cf. B. D. Chilton, A Galilean Rabbi and His Bible. Jesus' Understanding of the Inter-
preted Scripture of His Time: Good News Studies 6 (Wilmington: Glazier, 1984) 117-23.
            42. Cf. B. D. Chilton and J. I. H. McDonald, Jesus and the Ethics of the Kingdom: Bib-
lical Foundations in Theology (London: SPCK, 1987) 31-43.
            43. Cf. F. Hauck, "opheilō," Theological Dictionary of the New Testament 5 (ed.
G. Kittel, tr. G. W. Bromiley; Grand Rapids : Eerdmans, 1978) 559-66.
            44. Cf. Chilton and McDonald (1987) 40, 41; Chilton "w(j frage&llion . . . . "
            45. Jesus and Judaism 323.
            46. The plainest exposition of Sanders's overall picture is available in "Jesus, Paul,
and Judaism," Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt 25.1 (ed. W. Haase; Berlin :



88                 Bulletin for Biblical Research 1  

Where earlier scholarship portrayed the polarity as between works

and grace (utilizing the language of Paul), Sanders transposes it

between the concepts of covenant and universal inclusiveness. More-

over, Sanders pairs Jesus and Paul in contrast to early Christianity

generally, and so provides—in effect—a new account of the essence

of Christianity in the manner of Adolf von Harnack: the radical, prac-

tically antinomian teaching of the founders is rejected by Judaism and

subverted by Christianity. But such an ultimately simplistic account is

only conceivable when Jesus is set in opposition to a "Palestinian"

Judaism denatured of a concern for purity, and when Paul is placed in

the context of the same Judaism, although his natural habitat was

Hellenistic. If Judaism in the first century were a unitary, ideological

movement, and were Jesus and Paul characterized by philosophical

reflection, there would be some plausibility in Sanders's reconstruc-

tion. As matters stand, however, his Jesus and his Paul appear as refu-

gees from another century, and from a historiography which was

discarded long ago.

 

de Gruyter, 1982) 390-450. The similarity with the romanticism of Adolf von Harnack is
striking (cf. W. G. Kummel [tr. S. McL. Gilmour and H. C. Kee], The New Testament. The
History of the Investigation of Its Problems [ London : SCM, 1973] 178-84).

   

 


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